It is more difficult for reasoners to detect that the letter-number pair H7 verifies the conditional rule If there is not a T then there is not a 4 than to detect that it verifies the rule If there is an H then there is a 7. In prior work [Prado, J., & Noveck, I. A. (2007). Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: a parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19(4), 642-657], we argued that this difficulty was due to mismatching effects, i.e. perceptual mismatches that arise when the items mentioned in the rule (e.g. T and 4) mismatch those presented in the test-pair (H and 7). The present study aimed to test this claim directly by recording ERPs while participants evaluated conditional rules in the presence or absence of mismatches. We found that mismatches, not only trigger a frontocentral N2 (an ERP known to be related to perceptual mismatch) but that they, parametrically modulate its amplitude (e.g. two mismatches prompt a greater N2 than one). Our results indicate that the main role of negations in conditional rules is to focus attention on the negated constituent but also suggest that there is some inter-individual differences in the way participants apprehend such negations, as indicated by a correlation between N2 amplitude and participants' reaction times. Overall, these findings emphasize how overcoming perceptual features plays a role in the mismatching effect and extend the mismatch-related effects of the N2 into a reasoning task.
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Introduction
Deductive reasoning is an inference-making process that allows one to reach valid conclusions on the basis of prior information. While deductive inference-making has often been demonstrated to be fundamental to human cognition (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) , it has also been shown that people fall prey to biases that are often inconsistent with normative theories of logic (Evans, 1989; Stanovich, 2004) . For example, a large body of evidence in the reasoning literature shows that participants have difficulty disconfirming hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998) , and are highly influenced by the semantic (Evans, 1983) content of logical arguments. How to interpret this discrepancy between the observed behavior of reasoners and the normative standards of logic has been the subject of a long-standing debate, some researchers arguing that the gap was reflecting irrationalities of thinking (Evans, 1984 (Evans, , 2003 Stanovich, 2004) , while others emphasizing the fact that it was the manifestation of perfor-mance errors and computational limitations (Oaksford & Chater, 1995 , 1996 .
In conditional reasoning, it has been demonstrated that normative performances can be negatively influenced by perceptual mismatches between features mentioned in a rule and a test-item (Evans, 1972) . In order to illustrate this bias, consider the two conditional rules below:
(1) If there is a P then there is a 4. (2) If there is not a T then there is not a 7.
Both of the above rules are verified by the letter-number pair P4. However, it has been shown that participants experience more difficulty detecting that P4 confirms the rule in (2) than it confirms the rule in (1) (Evans, 1998) . This effect is believed to occur because, for the rule in (2), the lexical content of the rule (the letter T and the number 7) does not match the letter-number pair verifying it (the letter P and the number 4). This effect has been termed matching bias (Evans, 1998) , which underlines how matching cases encourage quicker responses, or mismatching effects (Prado & Noveck, 2007) , which underlines how mismatches lead to errors and slowdowns.
